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In endeavoring to b±ing forth and to elucidate to
a certain extent the almost voluminous amount of matter con-
tained n the reports from the earliest date to the present
time, I realize the conment upon each decision from a loginal
and critical standpoint to an ultimate harmonizing of each
would be impracticable as well as uncalled for. But if by
careful comparison and analysis of leading and pointed cases
I can trace the law on this subject from its inception to the
latest decision of today, and can bring them to a point of
harmony, logicallyterse and concise, I shall have attained my
end. The law upon this subject consists of but few well
chosen short and logical rules. Early formulated by a
careful , judicious and considerate court, and while each
principle has to some extent been criticised, questioned, and
its reasonableness severely debated upon, yet no principle of
this broad subject has ever been directly overruled or sup-
planted by other and later rules. And this being the feet
it appears by careful study that which has puzzled the courts
and taken up a grea.t amount of their time is not a discussion
of the law itself strictly, but its application to each ind,-
-2--
vidual and collective sets of facts. And such law being at
times severely stretche and at others possibly to leniently
applied gives rise to some discusion of its construction and
application thereof.
In the early .ase of Clark v. Fisher, 1 Paige, 171, the
court laid down the rule, that a person to be capable of mak-
ing a will should be possessed of a sound and disposing mind
and memory, with sense and judgment with reference to the
situation and the amount of his property, and the relative
claims of the different persons who are or might be the object
of his bounty. The court taking into consideration the
reasonableness of the will with reference to the omount of
his property and the situation of his relatives. It appears
that the court early saw the necessity of a somewhat string, nt
rule of capacity, and fully carried it into execution by
declaring, that testator must be able to distinguish his rela-
tions with reference t(% all claims upon him, (the testator,
and especially by taking into consideration and effect the
reasonableness of the will with reference to the amount of
his property. And it seems that the court woulT infer from
such situation a testamentary deficiency even though such
testator have the most sane and disposing mind.'
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And such was the law until we came to the celebrated case
of Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255. Alice Lispenard
whose will was souht to be established was entirely incapa-
ble of caring for herself, and probably was an imbecile. She
was in fact, in early life entirely helpless, would cry at
the least thing, could not read or write, had a violent temn-
per, but evidence showed that under good *reatment she ma~i-
fested signs of improvement, in that she could do little
things and carry on certain work, and could understand the
relation she bore to the household in general. And the
cpurt in ths case, I think not only only deviated from legis-
lativo intent, but practically made the wili o-F any person
of almost any mind whatever valid, if testator was sane and
had understanding to any extent whatever. And practically
held imbecility of mind not to incapacitate the testator.
And the court in construing the statute viz, ( idiots, luna-
tics and persons non compos mentis, are disable from dispos-
ing of their property,) evidently saw in the expression " non
compos mentis" the legislative intent to allow individual s
if not totally deprived of reason and sense toc dispose of
their property. And the court const rue ,,non compos menitis"
I think to mean that unless testator is totally deprived of
-4-
reason he may md e his will, in other words in the language
of the court " do not attempt to measure the extont of the
understanding of' testator if he be hot totally deprived of
reason" and whether he is or not, even if he has a very amount
of sense his will stands as a reason for his action, and he is
for that purpose deemed to be 11 compos montis.. And the
court practically holds tht a man may be able tc, mde- his will
and yet be unable to carry on his business.
From this decision it may be gathered that the right of
testamanetary disposItion is inherit in the existence of
every being, it is a natural right, and not one given by posi-s
tive law, but merely curtails and somewhat regulated and re-
strained. It appears therefore from this theory to throw
what I think is a very light and cloudy rule of action on
testators, and allows altogether too great privileges, in fmt
it places no standard whatever. I think when it says that
to
the court does not undertake/ m: easure extent of capacity bvt
merely to see if any capacity whatever and how little exists,
and if any then the right of testamentary disposition is to
be allowed. This case is a marked devia4 ion from the doc-
trine of Clark v. Fisher, which case construed ( compos ment is
to signify such an intellect and reason as would enable the
testator to know the relative claims and bounties of each of
his heirs, and understnnd clearly his property interests and
in fact hold that a strong degree of rnini. must exist.
In Clarkv. Sawyer, 2 N.Y., 499, the doctrine of Stewart
v. Lispenard, is fully corroborated and followed. However,
on reasonbng that mere imbecility of mind does not incapaci-
tate , if testator be not l1anatic or idiot. The case of
Thompson v. Thompson, 21 Barb. 107, severely criticises the
doctrine of Stewart v. Lispenard, and practically says, tha
if we are to take the doctrine of Stewart v. Lispenard as
authority, we must admit that if a person be not totally de.-
prived of mind and reason, he may lawfully dispose of his
property, and his will stands as the reasons for his actions.
And the court still further declares in Thompson v. Thompson,
that in deciding the Lispenard case, that the discussion of
the principles by carefully prepared opinions was omitted, as
the opinion was by the Senate, and all parties being busy,
not a single one brought. in a prepared and written opinion.
And they still further declare and it corroborates my theory
of the law upon this entire subject, that it was not a dis-
cusiion of the law but merely an appliuation to the facts in
the given case. And no opinion was ever ofically announced
-6-
by a majority of the court, and this was by the way one of the
great reasons for the court revision in 1846,. And in wind-
ing up the court says: ' they are of the opinion that the
decision in the Lispeard case has not declared or establishe
beyond question any principle of controlling, indisputable
authority, on the subject of testamentary capacity, and declares
that we are still free to examine the propositions contained
in the opinion of Senator Verplack, and to inquire whether
the court in passing upon the validity of a will do not meas-
ure the extent of the understanding of the testator, and if
not totally deprived of reason, tha his will stands as a re
reason for his action. But nevertheless it appears from an-
cient writers that the great body of persons regulated by the
law are included under the terms (non compos mentis ). And
Lord Coke, classified non compod mentis as :
1. Idiots,
2. Those utterly deprived by sickness.
so Lunatics.
4. Drunkards.
And from this classification was evidently excluded any
alienation of mind which did not constitute a person a luna-
tic, idiot, or drunkard. And Lord Hardiwicke held, ths£
-7-
unless testator suffered from a total disability of mind the
validity of his will could not be affected. But it appears
tha subsequent to Coke and Hardiwicke, the wisdom of the
above rule, which is practically the Stesart v. Lispenard rule
has been much questioned, and to use the words of the court,
in Thompson v. Thomps~n, " And within a comparitively recent
time the law has worked itself out of the state of great un-
certainty on this subject and has become in a measure clear
and intelligent. And English decisions as well as American,
( and which I may state were entirely overlooked by the court
in the Lispenard cme ) have questioned the rule of the
decision, and made the law somewhat logical and certain. The
law for more than twonty five years previous to 1855, evident-
ly contemplates three instedd of two ( idiots and lunatics)
states of mind, lunacy, idiocy, and unsoundness of mind, the
latter being emphatically distinguished from lunacy ad idiocy
And our Revised Statutes recognixe this by clearly stating
that there is a material difference between the first two
( idiocy and lunacy )and unsoundness. I R.S. 719, sec. lO.mar-
ginal, and also 2 R.S. 5f3. And therefore, the question now
is if not a lunatic or idiot had he unsound mind, the latter
refering to his. mental d ficiency arising from disease,
-0 -
infancy, old age, grief, etc., and the latter terms unsound-
ness of mind or non compos mentis, in its fixed legal meaning
means, free from liunacy, idiocy, or unsoundness of mind,
which would render testator incaoable of judging rightly.
The case of Brown v. Torrey, may be said to be authority for
the Lispenard case, but I think that from a critical examina-
tion of the same, that in that case the testator had capacity
which was fully establish(d by a preponderance of evidence,
and the court itseli says: " That while possibly recognizing
the undoerlying principlos of the Lispenard case, there is no
necessity in this decision for pushing the principle to any
such extent, for we have seen that testator had capacity,"
intimating that the Lispenard rule was severely stretched in
its inception.,
Watson v. Lynch, 28 Barb., 53, is possibly sometimes
cited as followvn g the Lispenard case, but I think even in
this case there was evidence that testator was possessed of
more than ordinary ability.
We are now about to enter upon what appears to be a new
epoch in the law of testamentary capacity. We are I think
about to deviate materially from the doctrine of Stewart v.
Lispenard, and though we shall not entirely throw aside the
-9-
doctrine of this case, we shall at least be compelled to say
that the doctrine of Stewart v. Lispenard by the best and
most logical authority henceforth, and subsequebt to 1862,
should be followed, and should be materially modified.
The great case of Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y., 0, marks
the new epoch. Hehry Parish, thetestator in this proceedings
was a wealthy and hihgly cultured merchant of N.Y., he had
made a will in 182, and, afterwards in 1849, he suffered a
severe attack from appoplexy, which entirely paralyzed his
left side, and which loft his mind impaired to the extent as
claimed by contesta ts, that he was entirely helpless and
unknowing, and was tota ly non compos. While the proponent
claimed that the codicils made subsequent to the stroke were
the work of a sound and disposing mind, and although Mr.Parish
could not communicate his ideas, yet he readily understood
business and carried it on. And the court held, that testa-
tor did not possess sufficient mind to make a valid and sub-
sisting will on the following theory and pr&nciple, that in
law, C I quote from opinion) the only stasndard as to mri~tal
capacity in all wh~o are not idiots or lunatics, is found in
the fact whether the testator is compos mentis or non compos
mentis, as the terms are used in their fixed legal meaning.
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And such being the rule, the question in every case is, had
the testator as compos mentis, capacity to make a will, and
not had he capacity to make the will prokduced. If compos
mentis, he could make any will however complicated, and if
non compos he can make no will however, not the simplest.
I think that this case while not directly overruling the
Ltspenard case, yet it feels itself free to establish new and
radically different principles, C I quote a few words from
opinion) The cas(. of Stewcart v. Lispehard has challenged
much discussion in this state and has not been regarded with
favor by the bench or bar. The circumstances under which
it was heard and decided on the part of the court are such as
to carry with it little if any weight of althority, ad if
that case is held good the will of a person conceded to be
but slightly removed from an idiot in intellectual power, may
at any time be admitted as a valid and subsisting will." This
decision in Delafield v. parish, seems to have come forth to
fill a long felt want in the line of legal principles on the
subject of testamentary capacity. it seeks to raise the
standard, to elevate the law, and to carry out the legisla-
tive intent, wh ich never intended that a I~rson of even slight
mind should have the responsible and valua~ble right of testa-
-l-
mentary capacity which the doctrine of Stewart v. Lispenard,
declared thet it might have. it seems to be logical and
reasonable that if a person has suffi.ient mind to make one
will he ought to be able to make any will however complicated
and it seeems unreasonable and unjust t1xt a person might be
said to make a given a will, but not have mind enough to make
any will. And the question is I think as it should be, has
he compos mentis, as that word is used in its fixed legal
meaning, i.e. has he sufficient mind to understand his situa-
tion, the situation of his property and of his relation, and
of the position of those who are or ought to be objects of
his bounty, does he sufficiently understand his business, can
he carry it on in a judiciuus manner, can he carry on a com-
Paritively shrewd convers tion, and can he understfzdldall
these questions if answered in the affirmative, seems to
bring his capacity within that rule of compos mentis estab-
lished by the statutes of the State of New York.
Reynolds v. Root, 62 Barb., 251, bears out the law of
Delafield v. Parish, and declares that a wvill however unjust
and unreasonable 4 may be in its provisions, is valid and
good if testator was coiupos montis as that term is legally
used. And that failure of memory does not incapacitate.
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And. the court says that, " no greater injustice could be done
in many tnstances by a testator than so to dispose of tis
property as to be what the world would call just.'
Gamble v. Gamble, 39 Barb., 373, also substantLitos the
theory of Reynolds v. Root, and holds that, the apparent in-
justice of a testator to members of his family, although ev-
idence to be taken into consideration in examining testator's
mind it is not enough of itself to invalidate the will.
Also Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N.Y., 153, says that the
simple fact that the testator may have died a few minutes
after making his will is m rely evidence and not proof of in-
capacity, and he is presumed sane until proven otherwise, and
that the fact that he gave ($50,.000)to his second wife and
only ($500) to his child is only evidehce but not proof that
testator was non compos.
In the case of Ean v. Snydcr, 46 Barb. ,230, the court
substantiates the principle of Delafield v, Parish, and de-
clares those principles a safe guide to follow in testamen-
tary disposition, and that it s not essential for courts to
extend their inquiries beyond the rules stated in that case.
And they declare the true question to be was the testator
compos or non compos as those words are used in their fixed
-13-
legal meaning. The court also declares the rule of Stewart
v. Lispenard, to be qualified by that of Delafield v. Parish.
I know of no better synopsis of tiB rule in Delafield v.
Parish, than that given by the court in the case of VanGuis-
ling v. VanCuren, this court after affirming and declaring
anew the doctrine of Delafiild v. Parish, substantially says,
that it is essential that testattor have such a capacity as
to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, his
relation to the persons who were or should or might have been
the object of his bounty, and the scope and bearings of the
provisions of his will, le must in the language of the
cases have sufficient active memory to collect in his mind
without prompting the particulars or elements of the business
to be transacted, and to hold them within his mind a suffi-
cient length of time to perceive at least their obvious rela-
tions to one another, and be able to form some rational judg-
ment in relation thereto. A person who has sufficient mental
power to do these things is I think within the meaning and
intent of the Statute of Wills, a person of sound mind and
memory, and is competent to dis~ose of his property by will.
In the matter of the Foreman Will, 54 Barb, 274, 1 see
the only case subsequent to the time of Delafield v. 0oarish,
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which in any way attempts to bear up the doctrine of Stewart
V. Lispenard,. The court puts rorward as a rule that if the
testator had capacity to make the will produced, thet if he
was sufficiently composmentis, to make a given will , he was
a person of sound mind within the statute, basing its opin-
ion on the idea that if testator knew enough to make a very
simple will in itself it was evident that he had a sane mind,
an§ could make any other,. But the conclusion of the c Lurt
as to his being able to necessarily make a more complicated
one seems to be unfounded and entirely without reason, and
while the case is clearly I think a modifier of Stewart v.
Lispenard, yet its doctrine and reasoning from the begginning
seems to be faulty, as it is very evident that a person might
be able to make asingle will not complicated in any degree,
and yet if called jxpon to do business, and make a complicated
and long will, and to use and bring into effect his memory,
he would utterly fail.
The case of inney v. Johnson, 60 Barb., 69, follows
and substantiates the doctrine of Delafield v. Parish and
declares that it be the law it only remains for the court to
apply it to given cases as they arise, and declares that the
"sound mind" required by the statute to qualify the person to
-15-
make a will cannot b(; satisfied by any different rule.
Smith v. Foreman, 7 Lansing,443, qualifies entirely
Delafield v. Parish, and declares that Stewart v. Lispenard,
is practically overruled by saying that" To enable a Im rson
to dispose of his property by will it is not enough that he
should be found to be possessed of some degree of intelligence
and mind, he must in addition have sufficient mind to compre-
hend the ture and effectoof the act ke is performing, the
relations be holds to the various individuals who might
naturally be expected to become objocts of his bounty, and to
be capable of making a rational selection of them."
Coit v. Patchen, 77 N*Y., 533, declares and modifies tie
doctrine of Delafield v. Parish, as is also the soi1le will
3 N.Y.SUpp., 359.
The case of Townsend v. Bogart, 5 Redfield, 93, while to
a certain extent modifying Stewart v. Lispenard, fundamentaly
I think rests for its decision on the theory of Delafield v
Parish. The decedent in the above case *as very illiterate
studdered badly, had bad temper, could not count more than
ten, would get ost on familiar streets, although having been
to school or the period of three years, yet he could not
read or write, and the court held, that decedent was not of
-10-
sound and dsiposing mind as required by the statute, and said
further that while the court did not intend to measure intell-
igenoe and define the exact amount of capacity or knowledge
a decedent must have before mwking his will yet, it does re-
quire such a mind as to be able to distinguish his propery
rights and the names of those whorare the natural objects of
h-is bounty, and that he should have a memory sufficient to
carry all such facts in his head and to be able to clearly
see the entire situation . -,t nevertheless such memory and
knowledge may be somewhat obscure and -yet capacity may
exist. In this case espeeially is the term compos mentis
liable to mislead and in the wvords of the court " Not all who
come within that description being compeent to mak.e a will,
and further says, that in Stewart v. Lispenard, the a person
being of weak understanding, so he being neither an idiot nor
a lunatic is no objection in law to his disposing of his
estate." Courts will not measure extent of understanding if
a man be legallycompos .entis, be he wise of unwise, he is
the disp ser of' his own property, and his will stands as the
reason for his own acts,. And the court further says that
the term compos ment is f'or th e purpose of unabling a person
to execute a will is laid down fully in Delaf'ield v. Parish.
-17-
Therefore while following Stewart v. Lispenard in thet possibl
and unwise and weak mineded mma may make 1 will as perStewart
v. Lispenvad, yet nevertheless he must have sufficient knowl-
edge and memory to understand the situtaion of his property
and those who are the natural objects of his bounty, practica-
ly therefore coming down to the doctrine in Delafield v .Par-
i sh.
Matter of Vedder, 14 St.Rep., 470, substantiates Delafiel
v. Parish.
The real point in issue is testamentary capacity or in-
capacity at the precise date of transaction. And an in-
struction that testator had testamentary capacity if he had
full and intelligent knowledge of his property, of thode en-
titled to his bounty, and of the nature of hiis acts, and that
he need no be capable of making contracts and doing business
generally, does not call for too high a degree of capacity.
And unsou. mind produced by disease does not prevent a valid
will. lIe may still have a disposing mind, while on the other
hand loss of memory entirely destroys testam~entary capacity.
But mere impairment of memory does not. And the use of
morphine by testator is merely evidence and oes not prima
facie incapacitate. Nor does extreme feeble healh incapa-
-18-
incapacitate, nor does fact that testator was suffering from
epilepsy. 1 N.Y.Supp. 120; 17 N.Y., 797; 12 At.Q12; 12
At. 689; 38 N.W. 392; 7 N.E. 056; 5 N.E. 17 ; 12 N.E.236;
7 N.E. 829 ;.
The will of a lunatic may be admitted to probate if
shown by proof to have been made during a lucid interval.
Thus is a will established prima facie and conforms to t1e
coneensus of authority, but there must be clear and convin-
cing proof of lucid intorvals, Gumerbault,v. Public Adm. 4
Bradford.
The will of an illeterate person who may be capricious,
easily excitable, and not only being frugal but who denies
himself comforts of life is a good one. If he thoroughly
understands the " ituation and if the will was made according
to his dictations exactly, and was afterwards read to him
understandingly and he acquiesced to the will it is good and
valid. In re Voohees, 27 St Rep.
Suicide is not of itself sufficient to invalidate a will
nor is it presumptive evidence of insanity on the issue. But
suggestions of insanity would be severely and critically im-
paired, by showing that decedent was tired of this world, etc.
and took no enjo~rment in it, and often expressed intentions
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to remove himself from earth saying and expressing disbelief
in the hereafter. In re Card, 20 St Rep.
The case of C mpbcll v. Campbell, holds that the princi-
ple laiddovm in Clark v. Fisher, and which conforms to those
laid down in Delafiold v. Parish is good and logical and
overrules Stewart v. Lispenard, as trying merely to apply and
not to argue the law.
In some extro,;c cases where it is apparent upon the face
of the will and from all the surronding circumstances it ap-
pears that the will is against the dictates of natural affect-
ion and is from its very conceptions unnatural in its provis-
ions, such will is evidonce of mental defect which may re-
quire explanation. In re Budlong, 126 N.Y. And again it h
has been held that where a testator made his will on his
death bed and he was so weak physically as to be unable to
T.ake his mark without assistance, that such facts were not
sufficient to invalidate the will provided that testator was
rational. And it has been absolutely held and without any
opposition that mere eccentricity of decedent will not inval-
idate. In re M~erriam, 42 St.Rep.
Any proof that testator was somewhat forgetful though
capable of appreciating the nature of' his act and the proper
.20.
objects of his bounty, and of designating without prompting
one in whose favor he wished the will drawn, is sufficient to
hold wills good. And failing memory does not per se estab-
lish want of capacity, while a man's ability to traasmt with
judgment and discretion if ery strong if not conclusive evi-
dence of capacity, And it appears that in all late cases
there is recognized but the one general standard compos or
non compos as that expression is used in its fixed legal
meaning. In re Stewart, 36 St Rep.
In re Dates, 35 St. RE.p.
In re Williams, 40 St. REp.
.hrite v. Ross, 48 St. Rep.
In ro Finn, 54 St. sep.
In re Wheeler, 5 Miiscellaneous.
In re Jones, .... O .
It has been my purpose through the comparison of cases
to take each line separately , that is, to first analyze
those under the general subject of unsoundness of mind . And
I have thus far confined myself to this technical division.
And have not touched upon the subject of insane delusions,
which subject bears a close resemblanee and is indeed a part
of such subject of non compos mentis. And some writers have
gone so far as to say that the only test of unsoundn~ess of
mind is the existence or non~.existence of insane delusions.
And while in a few particular cases I admit this as being the
proper rule, yet in the large majority of cases I think there
is no analogy and hence I will give the law upon that divis-
ion as it stands at the present day.
A person may be said to be under a delusion when he con-
cedes smething extravagant to exist which has no existence
whatever save in his own heated imagination. But he is
incapable of being reasoned out of that conception. And the
existenc- or noexistence of such delusions forms to a certain
extent the test as to compos or non compos menitis, and it may
be sd tat delusion in this sense of the word ad insanity
are convortible terms, and a will made according to and under
the imediate influence of such a drilsion which has not only
weakened but perverted testator's judgment and understanding
in relation to subjects connected with the provisions of the
will, so as to exercise a controlling influence in the dis-
position of his property is I think not th will of a parson
of sound mind and understanding, on that subject on which he
is supposed to exercise his powers in making the will. And
as an illustration it would not be sufficient to justify the
rejection of the will that a testator in other respects com-
petent entertained the mistaken idea that one of his daughters
was illegitimate if it was not the effect of an insane delus-
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ion. A :person persistently believing supposed facts which
have no real existence against all evidenco of probability
and conducting himself upon the assumption of their existence
is so far as such facts are concerned under an insane delusion
as if a testator at time of making his will is laboring under
any such delusion in respect to those who would naturally
have been the objects of his testamentary bounty, and the
court can see that the dispositions were or might have been
caused or affected by such delusions, such instruments would
not pass as a valid will.
It is said by some writers that insane delusions consist
in a belief of facts which no rational person would believe,
and a person ma have insane delusions as to some things and
not as to others, and it makes no diffe--ence how many such
delusions he may have provided they do not bear upon the
subjedt matter of the disposition etc. Partial insanity or
monomania invalidates a will without doubt which is a direct
offspring thereof, though the testator's general capacity
be unimpoeached. And to create a delusion which will annm.l
a will something more than an unwarranted conclusion from
existing facts must be drawn by the evidence. it is necess-
ary that the conclusions contorting the mine. should be un-
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founded and persisted in against all evidence indicating that
the facts described had no real existence. And in Phillip v
Chater, 1 Demarest, 35, the test of delusion is not whether
the judge or juror would have believed such a thing but can
he understand how any man in possession of his senses could
have believed such a thing.
In re Smith, 53 St. Rep.
In re Lockwood, 28 St.Rep.
Leslie v. Leslie, 15 Wk. Dig.
In re Keeler, 3 Supp.
Lathrop v Borden, 5 .un.5(0.
15 N.W. 545.
19 N.VI., 132
F7N.E. S.23
It is a well fovncxed &octrine and I will lay it down ab-
solutely that spiritualism in itself is not sufficient to
invalidate a will. But to render it so it must appear that
1evtsions of' the will were made in consequence of' some
strang imaginative fact supposed to exist and resulting from
the effects of spiritualism. 15 N.W.,578; In re Vedder, 14
St.Rcp., 470.
It has been held that long continued inebriety although
resulting in occasional insanity does not require proof of a
lucid interval to gibe validity to the ts of the drunkard,
as is required where general insa~nity is proven, but of
course where the practice has practically produced permanent
derangement of mind it would be otherwise it seems. And I
think tha it can safely be said that noither habitual intox-
ication nor the actual stimulus of liquors at time of execu-
ting a will will incapacitate a testator unless the excitoment
be such as to deaden his faculties and pervrt his judgmnut.
And it may be safely laid doi-n that the fact that the testator
at the time of making the will was under the influence of
liquor will not incapacitate him.
In re Reed., 3 Conley,.
2 N.W., 1084.
Peck v. Cary, 27 N.Y., 9.
The proponent of the will of an aged man for probate of
is not required to prove that the testator's mental faculties
were those of a man in middle life and of impaired physical
power. It is enough if he has sufficieht mental power to
fully comprehend the nature of the act he is doing , claims
of his children, and the position of his property. And it
may be saiid there is no presumption against a will because
made by a person of advanced age. Nor incapacity to make
the will be inferred from an enfeeliled condition of body. lie
simply muast have sufficient intelligence to realize the mean-
ing of his acts and their necessary consoque-_-Oe.
In re Wh(eler, 5 Miseel.
38 N.Wv., 392.
Horn v. Pullnan, 7_ N.Y., 270.
Tiaving now I think touched uon all the different phases
of mental irmpaizrment which could. possibly arise, and having
traced them from their beginning to their fullest developient
it only remains for me in order to complete my intention, to,
in a few words show in a clear concise and terse form the law
upon this entire subject as it stands today.
The legislature early enacted into out statutes the
provision that all idiots, luhatics, and persons of unsound
mind should not be able to dispose of their property by will.
And by so providingr plainly stated that there were three
classes of persons incapaditNted, idiots first, lunatics
second, who from the very fact of their total laUk of intell-
igence of whatsoever order were incapacitated., and person of
unsound mind. And it is upon this last exclusionary clause
that the authorities hinged almost exclusively. And as I
have followed from the beginning two different and distinct
lines of oases, namely, The Stewart v. Lispenard doctrine,
of which the theory was that tl2 possess ing of unsoundness of
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mind Eeant total lack of mind, or else no person was incapa-
citate , in the felafield v. Parish line of authority, which
construed the term in the statute of unsoundness of mind to
mean persons non compos mohtis Cs those words are used in
their fixed legal meaning. I have traced both line of au-
thorities and there is but one conclusion to come to, nanely,
that while the theory of Stewart v. Lispehard has not been
specifically overruled and set aside it did not lay down any
absolute and binding principles. It did not argue the law
but merely applied it as it appeared in an offhand way to the
senator court, who prepared no opinion upon it whatever. I
therefore say that it left the field clear of all binding pro
precedents, and that field was soon after taken possession of
by the Delafield v. Parish line of auth.rity, which is to my
thinking the only logical rule which could be brought forth
from the statute as embodying the true legislative intent.
And therefore the principles laid down by that court must
govern, and beyond question they do as the theory of that
case is followed in a long line of cases cited from that day
to the present. It was laid downu therefore in felafield v.
Parish and as stated as the law of today, that to bring a
testator within the provision of the statute relating to per-
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sons of unsound mind, it is essential that he should have
sufficient capacity to comprehend §erfectly the condition of
his property, his relations to tlB persons who weve or should
or might be the objects of his bounty and the scope abd bear-
ing of the provisions of his will. He must in the language
of tu cases have sufficient actibe memory to collect in his
mind without proptin the particulars or elements of the
business to be transacted, and to hold them in his mind a
s sufficient length of time to perceive at least their ob-
vious relations to each other, and to be able to form some
rational judgment in relation to them, and I may say that a
teetator who has sufficient mental power to do these things
is within the meaning mad intent of tje Statute of Wills, a
person of sound mind and memory, and is competent to dispose
of his proporty by viill. And the :question always is was
testator compos mentis or non compos as those words are used
in their fixed legal meaning, andnot did he ave capacity, to
make the will In question, but was he compos mentis, and if so
he could make any will however difficult.
The test of delusion is also a valid one and is competent.
The questio always being did testator havo or was he labor-
ing under such a misapprehencsion of facts as to lead him to
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make dispositions contrary to what he otherwise would, if so
then such delusion sufficiently shows insanity aid mental
unsoundness it plainly appearin that if the testator was
labori,.,g under such a delusion he could not ,-roperly under-
stand his property rights nad interests of those who ought
to be objects of his bounty.
As to drunkenness, a word will suffice, it is not
sufficient to invalidate a will that it be shown that testa-
tor was an habitual drunkard or oven to show he was under its
influence at time of making such di s-,osition and it is not
necessary to show lucid intervals, it rust only appear tha
he understood the nature of his w ts and the rights of those
who ought to be objects of his bounty.
As to spiriualism, it does not of itself invalidate the
will, and. in order to so act it must be conclusivelt, shown th
that by aviid through such belief testator was lead to make
such dispositions in a different maMner than he otherwise
would hadnot the belief existed.
As to old age,. There is no presumption 6xf incapacity
by reason of old age, and in order to incapacitate it must be
shown that tcstator was physically to enfeebled to understand
his property rights and the interests of those who ought to
-29-
be objects of his bounty.
And ,,Tith these explaheations I have completed ny outline
of thought. I -!ave sought to trace the New York law upon
this subject from its earliest inception to the present day.
And in so doing I am not unaware of the fact that repetition
and quotation have been frequently and of a necessity often
indulged in. But to try and state the principles espec-
ially upon this ubject and not to rfer oonstbntly to the de-
cisions for my authority could but necessarily result in a
confused mass of thought unprecedented and unsubstantiated.
And therefore if trOtigh this course by me followed you are
able to trace the law in its course and to discover the true
legislative intent as embodidod in the New York Statutes, my
original intention as I stated in the beginning will have
been fulfilled.
Glenn Mionroe Dennis.
Ithaca N.Y., May, 18, 1894.

